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Stolen FortiGate VPN Credentials Fuel Attacks

Stolen FortiGate VPN logins used for network intrusions and ransomware deployment

Stolen FortiGate VPN credentials are being used to enter corporate networks, map internal systems and deploy custom malware. The campaign does not rely on a new Fortinet vulnerability, but on valid passwords obtained through exposure, reuse or weak credential practices.

Cyderes disclosed the operation on 17 November 2026, linking it to a threat actor using the handle tcherber. Investigators found evidence of successful intrusions, an operational VPN access toolkit, malware delivery infrastructure and an exposed command and control panel containing 178 active bots.

How stolen FortiGate VPN credentials enabled access

Cyderes found a database containing more than 500 FortiGate VPN credential entries associated with organisations in multiple countries. Logs showed that the actor established successful root-level VPN tunnels into several victim environments during May and June 2026, with some connections remaining active for hours.

Because the FortiGate VPN credentials were valid, the connections could resemble legitimate remote access. Once the tunnel was established, the attacker could interact with internal services in much the same way as an authorised remote employee.

The operation used a Go-based toolkit supporting both FortiGate and SonicWall VPN connections. It automated much of the initial access and reconnaissance process, reducing the amount of manual work needed after a stolen login was obtained.

Automated internal reconnaissance

After connecting, the toolkit waited approximately 20 seconds for the VPN tunnel to settle before identifying internal routes. It then queried Active Directory through LDAP and wrote the collected information into report files for later use.

Additional modules scanned ports, listed accessible SMB shares and tested credentials against Windows systems. This allowed the operator to identify users, computers, file shares and potential routes for lateral movement shortly after entering a network.

Underground posts on rehubcom.pro advertised access to FortiGate and other network appliances, alongside custom loader and crypting services. A shared Tox contact connected these advertisements to the same operator. The seller reportedly filtered out targets in Commonwealth of Independent States countries and categorised victims by company revenue, behaviour consistent with an initial access brokerage business.

Timeline of the FortiGate VPN credentials campaign

  • May to June 2026: Logs examined by Cyderes recorded successful root-level VPN tunnels into multiple victim networks.
  • 17 to 19 June 2026: The FortiBleed credential exposure was publicly reported, followed by guidance from Fortinet, the UK NCSC and CISA.
  • 1 September 2026: VMRay Labs published research connecting the leaked build path /home/tcherber/ with a stealer, HVNC malware and ENIGMA Locker.
  • September 2026: The exposed command and control panel showed recently created agent builds, indicating continued development after the observed VPN sessions.
  • 17 November 2026: Cyderes published its investigation into tcherber’s VPN access brokerage and malware operation.
  • 18 November 2026: Secondary reports repeated the findings. No Fortinet advisory identifying a new vulnerability specific to tcherber had been issued.

The June FortiBleed incident provides important context for how large numbers of FortiGate VPN credentials may become available to criminals. Reports placed the number of exposed devices between approximately 73,932 and 86,000, reflecting different datasets and validation methods. Advisories consistently described it as credential exposure, not a newly discovered Fortinet software flaw.

Fake Windows Update delivers custom malware

The malware chain began with setup.exe, presented to the victim as a Windows Update installer. It displayed an installation message while dropping setup.ps1 and run.bat into C:\Users\Public.

The PowerShell script added the C: drive to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list. It then downloaded a certificate-encoded file named loader.cer from 93.152.223.30 on port 5000.

The Windows certutil utility decoded loader.cer into C:\Users\Public\svchost.exe. The resulting Rust loader was launched through a scheduled task, providing execution and a mechanism that could support persistence.

Stealer and remote control payloads

The Rust loader performed anti-analysis checks involving available memory, disk capacity, usernames and security tools. It also supported in-process manual mapping, allowing Windows executable payloads to run without following a conventional file execution process.

By default, the loader retrieved two main payloads. The first was an information stealer capable of sending collected data over HTTP and Telegram. The second was an HVNC implant, which gave the attacker interactive remote control while communicating through a custom protocol protected with AES-256-GCM encryption.

The HVNC component included functions for persistence and User Account Control bypass. Together, the stealer and remote access tool could support credential theft, surveillance and further malware deployment after the initial FortiGate VPN credentials had provided entry.

Links to ENIGMA Locker ransomware

Investigators found the build path /home/tcherber/ in Rust panic strings left inside malware samples. This development artefact connected the loader to additional Rust and Go tooling associated with the same identity.

VMRay independently observed the path across Zer0day Stealer, an HVNC tool and ENIGMA Locker ransomware. Its findings, including overlapping hashes and network infrastructure, support the assessment that the operator had capabilities extending from access brokerage and data theft to remote control and file encryption.

This does not establish that ransomware was deployed in every compromised environment. It does show that the tooling linked to tcherber could support an escalation from valid VPN access to ransomware operations.

Products affected and current exploitation status

The activity affects internet-reachable FortiGate appliances using SSL VPN when administrative or user credentials have been compromised. There is no specific FortiOS version range or new CVE attached to this campaign because exploitation depends on authentication with valid FortiGate VPN credentials rather than exploitation of a software defect.

The Go toolkit also supports SonicWall VPNs, although the database and confirmed sessions highlighted by Cyderes centred on FortiGate access. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild through the successful May and June connections.

Further evidence of operational activity came from an unauthenticated STANDALONE C2 Panel v3 at 158.94.209.138. The interface displayed 178 active bots. Related infrastructure included 93.152.223.30:5000, which hosted loader.cer and the default stealer and HVNC payloads, plus endpoints at 93.152.223.30:5555 and 93.152.220.87:5000.

Why this FortiGate credential attack matters

The campaign demonstrates that patching alone cannot stop an attacker who already possesses working FortiGate VPN credentials. Valid remote access can bypass the need to exploit an edge device and place an attacker directly inside the network perimeter.

For UK organisations, the combination of automated Active Directory discovery, SMB reconnaissance and ransomware-linked tooling creates a direct route from a reused password to widespread internal compromise. The observed root-level tunnels make investigation especially important where exposed credentials may have included privileged accounts.

Actions for organisations using FortiGate SSL VPN

  • Review VPN logs for unusual root-level sessions, unfamiliar source addresses and extended connections during May and June 2026.
  • Rotate all FortiGate administrative and VPN credentials, particularly reused, default or previously exposed passwords.
  • Enforce multifactor authentication for every VPN and administrative account.
  • Search for setup.exe, setup.ps1, run.bat, loader.cer and unexpected svchost.exe, stealer.exe or hvnc.exe files under C:\Users\Public.
  • Check for connections to the identified command and control infrastructure and investigate Defender exclusions affecting the C: drive.
  • Follow UK NCSC guidance to factory-reset and securely recommission a gateway if compromise or persistent access is suspected.

Management interfaces should not remain exposed to the internet, and UK NCSC guidance recommends stronger password derivation settings such as PBKDF2 for administrator accounts. These measures directly reduce the opportunity for tcherber and other access brokers to turn exposed FortiGate VPN credentials into internal access.

Originally reported by cybersecuritynews.com.

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About the Author

Headshot of Jonny Pelter, leading cyber security expert in the UK and CISO

Jonny Pelter

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Jonny Pelter

Jonny is a Founding Partner at CyPro and executive group level CISO who has worked closely with the British intelligence agencies NCSC and GCHQ.

An ex-professional rugby player and originating from KPMG and Deloitte, Jonny has a wealth of experience across numerous sectors including technology, critical national infrastructure, financial services, oil & gas, insurance, betting, pharmaceuticals and utilities.

Jonny is a leading cyber security expert in the UK, having featured on national media for his professional commentary such as BBC News, iPlayer, Telegraph and Times Radio.

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