Opens in a new tab

Underground Access Listings Expose Enterprise Risk

Underground listings advertise access to enterprise VPNs, cloud accounts and CI/CD systems

Nine underground access listings have revealed how alleged entry points into enterprise systems are packaged and sold. The advertisements covered VPN accounts, cloud keys, CI/CD administration, remote desktop access and authenticated SaaS sessions.

ThreatMon observed the posts on DarkForums, Exploitin and PwnForums between 2 and 9 November 2026. Its research, published on 11 November 2026, repeatedly cautioned that every access claim came from a seller and remained unverified.

What the underground access listings offered

The underground access listings were not simple collections of usernames and passwords. Sellers described the level of privilege, number of reachable systems and business function associated with each alleged account, key or session. Several posts were marked as sold, but that status did not establish that the advertised access was genuine.

The nine advertisements allegedly covered VPN access, Remote Desktop Protocol access, TeamCity administration, cloud credentials, source code repositories and logged-in business application sessions. Named services included Fortinet FortiGate, FortiSSLVPN, Ivanti Pulse Secure or Connect Secure, Alibaba Cloud, AWS, PandaDoc, Slack, Twilio and BrowserStack.

No affected organisation confirmed a breach, and no forensic evidence was published. There were also no associated IP addresses, malicious domains, file hashes or other technical indicators that defenders could use to verify the sellers’ stories.

High privilege TeamCity and build host access

A detailed listing posted on 5 November concerned a Nordic warehouse automation company. A seller using the handle marlowfinch42 claimed access to a JetBrains TeamCity account with the SYSTEM_ADMIN role, Windows SYSTEM privileges on a domain joined build host, and the sysadmin role on Microsoft SQL Server 2017.

The seller also claimed that the deployment environment contained 28 databases and 1,133 targets across 130 customer environments. Neither the permissions nor the claimed customer reach was independently confirmed, and no TeamCity version was stated.

This example is important because the seller described an existing TeamCity user record, not exploitation of a software vulnerability. Applying a patch would not necessarily remove a valid but stolen or abused account.

If genuine, a server-wide TeamCity administrator could influence projects, builds, plugins, credentials and deployment processes. Windows SYSTEM provides extensive local privileges, while SQL Server’s sysadmin role gives unrestricted control over the database instance. Together, these permissions could expose build secrets and software delivery paths without requiring Domain Admin rights, which the seller specifically denied having.

Pulse Secure and Fortinet VPN access

Two underground access listings focused on remote access into manufacturers. BigTuna advertised alleged Pulse Secure VPN access to a Turkish manufacturer for $980, claiming Enterprise Admin privileges and access involving more than 10,000 hosts. The precise product version was not stated.

Another seller, SCP-2013, sought $4,000 for an alleged package involving FortiGate or FortiSSLVPN and SSH access to a US manufacturer. The advertisement referenced 81 hosts, although it did not demonstrate that all were reachable through the offered access. No Fortinet version was disclosed.

These advertisements concerned accounts or sessions rather than a named vulnerability or exploit. Although Ivanti Connect Secure and Fortinet appliances have attracted attacker attention, the researchers did not connect these particular claims to any security flaw, exploit chain or proof of concept.

Cloud keys, SaaS sessions and business data

One ERP SaaS listing claimed to bundle 180 Alibaba Cloud RAM AccessKey pairs, of which 114 were described as active. The seller also alleged access involving 525 Elastic Compute Service instances, 237,498 plaintext MySQL credentials and 44,807 API tokens.

Alibaba Cloud RAM AccessKeys are programmatic credentials. If valid and broadly permissioned, they could allow actions against cloud resources without an interactive login. The advertisement did not establish which policies were attached to the keys, whether the credentials remained active, or whether the figures were accurate.

Other underground access listings referred to AWS EC2 and S3 resources, Slack, Twilio, BrowserStack and source code repositories linked to a mobile game publisher. Another offered an authenticated PandaDoc session that allegedly exposed more than 8,000 documents.

An authenticated session presents a different problem from a stolen password. Replaying a valid session token may place an intruder into a post-authentication state, potentially bypassing the MFA challenge that protected the original login. The reporting did not reveal how any session or credential was obtained.

Timeline and current exploitation status

  • 2 to 9 November 2026: ThreatMon observed the nine advertisements across DarkForums, Exploitin and PwnForums.

  • 5 November 2026: The detailed TeamCity and build environment advertisement appeared.

  • 11 November 2026: ThreatMon published its analysis and stressed that the seller claims were unverified.

  • 16 November 2026: Cyber Security News and other outlets reported the findings, without adding independent confirmation of the alleged breaches.

As of 16 November 2026, there was no verified victim intrusion tied to the nine underground access listings. One French RDP advertisement was marked sold, and its seller claimed the access had been used. ThreatMon treated this only as forum context, not evidence that a compromise occurred.

No seller was attributed to a recognised ransomware group or other established threat actor. The named handles included marlowfinch42, BigTuna and SCP-2013, but limited forum histories made their credibility difficult to assess.

Why underground access listings matter

Even when unverified, underground access listings show what access brokers believe buyers will value. High privilege VPN accounts, CI/CD administrators, long-lived cloud keys and active application sessions can provide direct routes to sensitive systems, data or deployment processes.

The pricing also illustrates that perceived reach affects value. A $980 VPN account and a $4,000 remote access package were promoted using claimed privilege levels and host counts, while the TeamCity offer emphasised control over a software delivery environment.

Actions tied to the alleged enterprise access

Organisations using the named technologies should treat the report as a prompt for targeted review, not proof that their systems are compromised. Priority checks should reflect the access types advertised:

  • Review TeamCity administrator roles, build agent privileges and recent account changes. Disable unnecessary guest or super-user access, protect stored secrets and apply current JetBrains security updates.

  • Examine Fortinet and Ivanti VPN logs for unusual locations, new administrative sessions and unexpected configuration changes. Restrict management exposure, require MFA or certificates, and follow current vendor integrity and hardening guidance.

  • Rotate suspected Alibaba Cloud and AWS keys, reduce permissions, remove unused credentials and investigate unusual API activity before issuing replacements.

  • Revoke suspicious SaaS sessions and review token reuse, impossible travel and abnormal document access. A password reset alone may not invalidate every active session.

Because no public indicators accompanied these underground access listings, organisations cannot rely on a shared blocklist. Account, session and audit log review is the most direct way to determine whether similar access exists in their own environments.

Originally reported by cybersecuritynews.com.

Share this bulletin

About the Author

Headshot of Jonny Pelter, leading cyber security expert in the UK and CISO

Jonny Pelter

Partner

  • CIPM
  • CIPP/E
  • CISSP
  • CISM
  • CRISC
  • ISO27001
  • Prince2
  • MSc
  • BSc

Jonny Pelter

Jonny is a Founding Partner at CyPro and executive group level CISO who has worked closely with the British intelligence agencies NCSC and GCHQ.

An ex-professional rugby player and originating from KPMG and Deloitte, Jonny has a wealth of experience across numerous sectors including technology, critical national infrastructure, financial services, oil & gas, insurance, betting, pharmaceuticals and utilities.

Jonny is a leading cyber security expert in the UK, having featured on national media for his professional commentary such as BBC News, iPlayer, Telegraph and Times Radio.

View Profile
Back to Bulletins

Related CyPro Services

  • Managed Detection and Response (MDR)

    Managed Detection and Response (MDR) is an end-to-end managed service designed to help organisations detect, analyse and respond to cyber threats quickly and effectively. It...
    View Service
CyPro Cookie Consent

Hmmm cookies...

Our delicious cookies make your experience smooth and secure.

Privacy PolicyOkay, got it!

We use cookies to enhance your experience, analyse site traffic, and for marketing purposes. For more information on how we handle your personal data, please see our Privacy Policy.

Schedule a Call